Generalized Conversational Implicature in English and Arabic Religious Texts: A Contrastive Study

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Abstract

A generalized conversational implicature (GCI) is an inference generated by a violation of a maxim, a failure to perform a maxim, particularly the first maxim of Quantity on the one hand, and by indirectness conditions, especially those indicative conditionals or disjunctives with non-truth functional grounds on the other (Grice, 1989: 38, 61).

As for the generalized conversational implicature, two models, Grice’s and that of الجرجاني, are to be considered for the purpose of comparison between English and Arabic religious texts in the present study. GCI in Arabic is mainly embodied in «المجاز المرسل» (transformational allegory) which الجرجاني propounds under «اللفظ و النظم» (utterance and syntagm).

This research aims at:

1. Tracing similarities and differences between English and Arabic as far as the notion of GCI is concerned.
2. Finding a common criterion for the pragmatic analysis of GCI in English and Arabic religious texts.
3. Identifying the indication of GCI in selected religious texts in English and Arabic.

It is hypothesized that:

1. Points of accord can be observed between Grice and الجرجاني in their propounding of the generalized conversational implicature.
2. Religious texts carrying generalized conversational
implicatures are exposed to be more economic and more effective.

3. Generalized conversational implicatures can lead to purposes of either favourable or unfavourable implications.

The following are the steps to be followed in the study:

1. Surveying the notion of GCI in English and Arabic.

2. Describing English and Arabic data of generalized conversational implicature, using the models which yield descriptions of either language.

3. Applying the notion of GCI to English and Arabic religious texts selected from The New Testament and the Glorious Qur’an.

4. Investigating the aspects of similarity and difference of this notion in both English and Arabic.

The findings of the investigation validate the above hypotheses.
ملخص البحث

ان المضمون الكلامي العامية هي استنتاجات ذهنية تستنبط من معنى الكلام تلائماً مع مقتضى الحال المؤدي إلى قصد المتكلم وغرضه ويُدثَّر زوب الاعراب، إذ تأخذ هذه الدراسة بعين الاعتبار المضمون الكلامي العاطفي الذي يدرج ضمن نظم الكلام.

يعد هذا البحث دراسة مقارنة عن المضمون الكلامي استناداً إلى ما جاء به في اللغة الانكليزية والجرجاني في اللغة العربية، مطبقاً على النصوص الدينية الانكليزية والعربية. ولذلك تحاول الدراسة ملء الأهداف الآتية: (أ) وصف والجرجاني من أجل اقامة أساساً للمضمون الكلامي العامي حسب ما جاء به Grice للمقارنة بين اللغتين. (ب) تطبيق النتائج الحاصلة من (أ) في تحليل النصوص الدينية الانكليزية والعربية.

لتحقيق هذه الأهداف، قُدِّمت الفرضيات الآتية: (أ) ان المضمون الكلامية كمفهوم مستقصاة في اللغتين الانكليزية و العربية تحتمل اوجه شبه بين اللغتين. (ب) الايجاز والتأثير هو ما يدفع المتكلم إلى إقامة الفاظ ذو مضمون كالامية. (ج) ينتج عن المضمون الكلامي إما غرض مستحسن أو غير مستحسن. اسفرت نتائج البحث عن اثبات جميع هذه الفرضيات من حيث تطابق النتائج مع الفرضيات الموضوعة والأهداف المرجوة من الدراسة.
1. GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
IN ENGLISH

Introduction

As a leading thinker of the school of the ordinary language philosophy (Huang, 2007: 3), Herbert Paul Grice, universally known as Paul, was born in 1913 in Birmingham, England, and died in 1988 in California. In a series of papers, he developed his philosophy of the relationship among an utterance, its explicit meaning and those inferences that can be derived to indicate an implicature (or implicatures) carried in an utterance. The best known of his ideas is that of a “conversational implicature”, appeared in passing in a 1961 paper “The Causal Theory of Perception” (http://plato.stanford.edu), and as a term it was introduced in a 1967 lecture to denote those requirements accepted as reasonable for effective communication which, if violated, could cause a breakdown in communication. Drawing on Kant’s four logical functions of reason, Grice [1975] postulates four maxims of conversation: the maxim of Quantity, the maxim of Quality, the maxim of Relation and the maxim of Manner. Grice derives these conversational maxims from his cardinal maxim, the so-called ‘Cooperative Principle’ (Bussmann, 1996: 72930-).

1.2 Grice’s Theory of Conversational Implicature

Grundy (2000: 78), following Grice’s logical rules of conversation, sums up that knowing the Cooperative Principle and its maxims enables an addressee to draw inferences as to the implied meanings (or implicatures) of utterances. However, Verschueren and Ostman (2009: 104) indicate that “the maxims comprise the Cooperative Principle in toto, with implicature external to it”. Conversational
implicatures are subsumed under the Cooperative Principle since it is intended to be a means of making conversational contributions ‘cooperative’. A conversational implicature is a follow-up in which a hearer first attempt to make sense of an utterance by recourse to the maxims alone; if this fails, he resorts to implicatures to determine its meaning and its speaker’s intention.

1.2.1 The Cooperative Principle and the Conversational Maxims

Devitt and Hanley (2006: 155) state that Grice presents his Cooperative Principle and the conversational maxims as guidelines for how to communicate successfully. Grice (1989:267-) explicates his governing dictum, the Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”. This general principle is instantiated by general maxims of conversation governing rational interchange. Echoing Kant, Grice presents four main categories (or maxims) that yield results in accordance with the “Cooperative Principle”. Following Grice, talk exchanges exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions:

1. The participants have some common immediate aim that each one should identify himself with the transitory conversational interests of the other.

2. The contributions of the participants should be dovetailed, mutually dependent.

3. There is some sort of understanding that the transaction should continue in an appropriate style unless the parties (of participants) are agreeable that it should terminate.

(ibid: 29)
Grice (ibid:267-) offers four maxims: the maxim of Quantity, the maxim of Quality, the maxim of Relation and the maxim of Manner, to which a maxim of politeness is attached. These maxims together with the Cooperative Principle are the basis for rational communication. Thus, these conversational maxims are:

a) **The Maxim of Quantity**: The category of Quantity relates to the quantity of information to be provided and under which fall the following maxims:

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

The maxim of Quantity is also called as the maxim of Informativeness (Kearns, 2000: 258). Maxim 1 requires a speaker to give enough information that enables a hearer to recognize his intention. Maxim 2 requires a speaker not to give redundant information passing through extra words.

b) **The Maxim of Quality**: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

c) **The Maxim of Relation**: Be relevant.

d) **The Maxim of Manner**: Be perspicuous. It is related to how what is said is to be said.

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (Avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

(Grice, 1989: 27)

Facilitate in your form of expression the appropriate reply.

(ibid: 273)

e) A Social Maxim: Be Polite.

1.3 Generalized Conversational Implicature

In his clarification of the generalized conversational implicature, Grice (ibid:37) excludes what he referred to be the source product of particularized conversational implicature, that is to say, flouting the maxims, considering a failure to fulfill a maxim, particularly the maxim of Quantity. This failure results in generating a GCI which can be derived from Grice’s dictum that “the use of a certain form of words in an utterance would normally (in the absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature”.

In generating a generalized conversational implicature, a speaker fails to be specific in such a way that he might be expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific. This is a familiar implicature situation and is classifiable as a failure, for one reason or another, to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Grice, 1989: 38). In his account of the Occam’s Razor theory that “senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”, Grice suggests an analysis for transferred senses of lexical items, a principle that people always prefer to opt the less restrictive rather than the more restrictive meaning of a word, where choice is a possibility (ibid: 478-; Levinson, 2000: 20; Mey, 2009: 176). In using the expression “an X”, three senses are possible (only one of them is a generalized conversational implicature):
a- An example of the first sense is:

1- Robert is meeting a woman this evening.

The indefinite article “a” means roughly (i.e. in a more restrictive sense) something that satisfies the conditions defining the word “woman”, in which one would normally (“normally” indicates that it is a conventional implicature rather than a generalized one) implicate that the person to be met is someone other than Robert’s wife, mother, sister, or perhaps even close platonic friend; it is a conventional implicature whose meaning is directly derived from the meaning of “an X”. Here, the one X (woman) concerned is excluded from all other Xs (i.e. wife, mother, sister, or perhaps even close platonic friend)(Grice, [1975] 1989: 38; Leech, 1983:11, 90).

b- An example of the second sense, in which there would normally be no such an implicature, is:

2- I have been sitting in a car all morning.

It means approximately “a car” (in a more restrictive meaning) that is only remotely related in a certain way to some person (whose car) indicated by the context. So, any sort of implicature is cancelled.

c- An example of the third sense, which may convey the reverse to conventional implicature, i.e. a generalized conversational implicature, is:

3- I broke a finger yesterday.

In this example, “a finger”, which could possibly refer to the speaker’s finger in a less restrictive sense, is closely related in a certain way to some person indicated by the context. These three senses are reliable to the recipient’s concomitants and results which specify the type of transaction between a person and other persons or things closely connected with him (Grice, 1989: 38).
Another example of the GCI which is given by Clark and Clark (1977: 122 cited in Leech, 1983: 91), following Grice’s model, can be compared with (1) above:

4. A- Wilfrid is meeting a woman for dinner tonight.
   
   B- Does his wife know about it?
   
   A- Of course she does. The woman he is meeting is his wife.

Speaker A fails to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity because he does not present the adequate amount of information that B (as a hearer) needs to perceive the intended meaning; notwithstanding, the hearer does not recognize the intended meaning conveyed by the speaker.

A positive account of the presence of a GCI of the “indirectness condition”, offending the first maxim of Quantity by the supposition of a clash with the second maxim of Quality, is an implicature which, if conversational in character, need not be present in every special case, as in saying:

5. If he was surprised, he didn’t show it.
   (Grice, 1989: 61-2)

The orderliness of a “style disjunct” (see Quirk et al. 1985: 1070) in (5) can specify the generalized conversational implicature. A speaker who advances a disjunctive normally implicates that there are non-truth-functional grounds for saying what he says (Grice, 1989: 63). Here the speaker implicates the verb of saying and the subject “I”:

5 a. If he was surprised, (I tell you that) he didn’t show it.

and he treats “if” as if it means “supposing”. “If” seems to be the only connective to be non-commutative; however, the orderliness of the clauses of a conditional is semantically not a matter of
indifference (ibid: 67, 72). In other words, to say:

5 b- He was expected to show surprise if he was surprised.

is to implicate that he was neither surprised, nor did he show it. Thus, the objective pronoun “it” refers to his being surprised; but in 6,

6- He didn’t show it if he was surprised.

he showed it because he was not surprised. “it” refers to something other than his being surprised.

The “certain form of words” (i.e. “a”, “if”, “either …. or” in examples 3, 4, 5 and 7) with which generalized conversational implicatures are generated, belong to grammatical categories of closed-class items (see Quirk et al. 1985:67).

1.4 Properties of Generalized Conversational Implicature

There are certain features that can characterize generalized conversational implicatures:

1- Cancellability

Cancellability (or defeasibility) means that it is possible to withdraw an implicature within the situation of an utterance without any contradiction (Mey, 2009:366). A GCI can be canceled by the addition of a clause that states or implies that a speaker opts out the observation of the Cooperative Principle, or it may be contextually cancelled (Grice, 1989: 39). For example, the GCI in (7), where a speaker puts a prize in his garden and tells his children that:

1- The prize is either in the garden or in the attic.

is cancelled in:
8- The prize is either in the garden or in the attic. I know that because I know where I put it, but I am not going to tell you.

(ibid: 445-)

In (7), it is not the matter that the speaker is ignorant of the truth-value of the “disjunctive meaning of either---- or” (see Quirk et al. 1985: 1100), but he intends to puzzle his children for such a prize.

2- Non-Detachability

A GCI is expected to exhibit a fairly high degree of non-detachability insofar as the implicature is carried because of what is said; so, it is not possible to find another way of saying the same thing which simply lacks the implicature (Grice: 1989, 43). In other words, any linguistic expression with the same semantic content tends to carry the same conversational implicature because conversational implicatures are attached to the semantic content rather than the linguistic form, of what is said (Huang: 2007: 34). For example, to assume that there was a failure if one says:

9- A tried to do X.

resulting in a generalized conversational implicature, this implicature would likely be carried if one says:

10- A attempted to do X., or
11- A endeavoured to do X.

(Grice, 1989: 43)

3- Non-truth-functional

Grice rejects formal approaches, with their claim that the only meaning amenable to philosophical discussion is that which could be described in terms of truth-conditions, and could enter into truth-
functional relationships (Chapman, 2005: 2). Since the truth of a GCI is not required by the truth of what is said (what is said may be true—what is implicated may be false), a conversational implicature is not carried by what is said, but only by the saying of what is said, or by “putting it that way” (Grice: 1989: 39, 62).

1.5 A Perspective on Generalized Conversational Implicature

Grice’s theory of GCI has been subject to elucidation. The most prominent perspective of the GCI is that of Levinson.

1.5.1 Levinson’s Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature

Levinson (1983:1323-) delineates Grice’s theory of GCI to entailments of logical forms, namely scalar Quantity implicatures and clausal Quantity implicatures. For the former, he gives the following examples:

12- All of the boys went to the party.

13- Some of the boys went to the party.

As for Levinson, the quantifiers “all” and “some” form an implicational scale because any sentence like (12) entails (13), and whenever (12) is true (13) is true also but not vice versa. However, Levinson’s Scalar implicature is concerned, for example, with a relation between quantifiers, such as “all” and “some”, whereas Grice’s notion of GCI is concerned with how the first maxim of Quantity, i.e. the quantity of information needed in an utterance, is infringed, due to an infringement in a grammatical category. In Grice’s account of the generalized conversational implicature, a speaker is supposed to give information less than what is needed in an utterance.
As for the clausal Quantity implicatures, Levinson (1983:136) assumes that by saying the utterance:

14- I believe John is away.

one implicates that there is a possibility that “John is in fact not away”. This implication would not be carried if the verb “believe” is substituted with the verb “know”. Accordingly, this implication is conventional because it is among those which “are derived directly from the meanings of the words” (Leech, 1983:11); so, what Levinson supposes to be a GCI is a conventional implicature due to Grice’s theory of conversation.

Another concern can be observed in Levinson’s (2000) model of the generalized conversational implicature. Grice (1989: 8 - 10) exposes Strawson’s view of entailment, (i.e. “if p then q” entails p → q,” the reverse entailment does not hold) as he distinguishes between the realization of an entailment and an “explanation” of linguistic inappropriateness, which could result in an implicature. The example that Grice presents is:

15- My wife is either in Oxford or in London.

This entails that the speaker does not perfectly know where his wife is; if a speaker knows that his wife is in Oxford and, nonetheless, he makes this utterance, he is said to be “ignorant of the truth-values of the particular disjuncts”. Grice gives an alternate view: “How could it be more certain that my wife is either in Oxford or in London than by its being certain that she is in Oxford?” The contradiction between the truth values of “either...... or” and the way the speaker uses it promotes a desire to find some explanation of the relevant linguistic inappropriateness, generating a generalized conversational implicature.

Conversely, Levinson (2000: 17) draws a distinction different from that of Gricean perception of the generalized conversational
implicature; he regards what Grice considers as conventional implicature to be taken as generalized conversational implicature. Levinson takes into consideration Grice’s example of conventional implicature, i.e. “X is meeting a woman this evening.” (see example (4) above) rather than the intended example, i.e. “I broke a finger yesterday”. This can be explained in the demonstration that Levinson presents about Grice’s generalized conversational implicature: first, he claimed that “Grice provides only one, none too clear, example”, i.e.:

16- I saw a woman in my office.

with a suggested GCI (I saw someone other than my wife/ girlfriend/mother/etc.); nevertheless, the present study presents four examples (3, 5, 7 and 15) suggested by Grice for the generalized conversational implicature; second, Levinson’s justification (that the utterance in (16) carries a GCI because “the speaker fails to be specific in a way in which he might be expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific”) exhibits a contradiction to the derived implicature. However, Levinson gives a different direction for deciding the generalized conversational implicature. It is obvious that in Grice’s example, “X is meeting a woman this evening”, the speaker does not fail to be specific because “a woman” is not intended to be specific and because this “woman” is, as in Levinson’s words, “someone other than my wife/ girlfriend/ mother/ etc,” taking into account that the referred to as” my wife/ girlfriend/mother/ etc,” are presumed to be specific. Accordingly, the speaker is neither specific nor expected to be specific in his utterance. Misfire of Grice’s precise example of the GCI is what makes Levinson say “Grice provides only one, none too clear, example” and makes Leech (1983: 91) remark “but is yet very misleading in a pragmatic way”.

Levinson (2000: 31–3) develops his revision of Grice’s maxims from three heuristics that follow from the anthropological need to
overcome the “fundamental bottleneck in the efficiency of human communication, occasioned no doubt by absolute physiological constraints on the articulators”. According to Levinson, Grice’s rationalistic Cooperative Principle plays no role. Levinson’s Heuristics are:

- Heuristic 1: What is not said, isn’t.
- Heuristic 2: What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified.
- Heuristic 3: What is said in an abnormal way isn’t normal; or marked message indicates marked situation.

**1.6 Conversational Implicature, Interpretation and the Purpose of Speech**

Grice’s theory is in part a theory of interpretation or understanding (Davis, 1998: 14). As Grice’s inferential approach to conversation explains how a hearer selects the interpretation which the speaker intends, there is a general assumption that the interpretation of an utterance is a collaborative enterprise guided by the Cooperative Principle. A conversational implicature can be derived by a retrieving interpretation through a process of reasoning in the face of an apparent violation of the maxims which lie at the heart of the Gricean account of conversation (Aronoff and Rees-Miller, 2003: 4012-).

Grice’s notion of conversational implicature is based on the idea that logical form of an utterance may be to a certain extent different from context-bound interpretation, with general principles of language use mediating between the two (Chapman, 2005: 118,167). Two levels of interpretation are to be tackled to reach a speaker’s intention. The first is that of “usual interpretation”, indicating a speaker’s intended meaning down to adherence to the Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims; the second is that
level in which the “usual interpretation” is not “sacrosanct” and possibly abandoned, but replaced by a “closely allied interpretation” that embodies a conversational implicature. The Cooperative Principle is intuitively attractive and it seems likely that participants (unconsciously) use it in their interpretation of discourse, though different societies may interpret the maxims differently (Grice, 1989:65).

In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim or an accepted purpose representing transitory conversational interests of the participants who are expected to identify them. Participants recognize a common purpose or a set of purposes which are connected to the conversational maxims and which a conversational implicature is supposed to serve. Speaking with a mode of speech resulting in conversational implicature appears to be connected to the expression of a certain feeling, attitude or evaluation such as hostile or derogatory judgment, indignation or contempt (Grice, 1989: 28,9-4-53). Therefore, a conversational implicature carried in an utterance aims at serving the purpose of talk exchange. The purpose of speech is the end point in the interpretation of an utterance as it reflects the aim why participants exchange information. Interpretation is an intellectual manipulation that transfers speaker’s utterance into an intended meaning and purpose in a hearer’s thought. The following figure delineates the levels mediating between an utterance and the purpose of communication.
2. GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE IN ARABIC

2.1 Introduction

Generalized conversational implicature, as a concept, is a central notion in Arabic logic and rhetoric and it has been enriched with explanations and details, especially in "علم البيان" (the Science of Eloquence). It can historically be traced in the rhetorical theories which are established by عبد القاهر بن عبد الرحمن بن محمد الجرجا (born in Jurjan, born in Jurjan, 1078; مطروب, 1973: 15; Owens and Elgibali, 2010: 10)) who gave the Science of Eloquence a comprehensive account in his books "أسرار البلاغة" (Secrets of Rhetoric) and "دلائل الإعجاز" (Proofs of Inimitability) and he made it an independent rhetorical discipline (Abdul-Raof, المراغي, المراهنة, 2006: 198: المراهنة, 2007: 209; عبد المراغي, n.d: 43). Working on both logic and conversation, الجرجا sets up the foundation of a discipline concerned with intellectual scheme for communication.
2.2 Generalized Conversational Implicature

GCI can be observed in what آية الجرجاني (transformational allegory). The term آية المرسل (transformational) is derived from the assumption that a proposition is to be transformed from a subsidiary way other than the original (المقريزي، 1999:Vol.12266/). This type of allegory is associated to meaning based syntagm and it makes sense of an implicature by a seeming violation of the syntactic formulation of an utterance, such as آية الخفف، و الزيادة، التقديم و التأخير، التعريف والتنكر، التكرار (الجرياني، 1989:85, 250)(ellipsis and addition, preposing or postposing, use of definite/ indefinite article and repetition). This does not mean that any of these processes result in a GCI with the mere use of such, unless they are employed for certain purposes and effect linguistic and conceptual economy; so, a speaker may intend an additional meaning in making such modes. آية الجرجاني in this type of allegory follows آية الشيخ أبو علي» whose referent likely denotes آية أبي الفارسي (الجرياني، 204 (أبو علي الفarsi)). As for a word which is (apparently) unacceptable from one aspect and acceptable from another, Abu Ali gives this label:“considerable from a point of view”, “inconsiderable from another point of view”.

For instance, in the following qur’anic verse:

لِئَلاَّ يَعْلَمَ أَهْلُ الْكِتَابِ أَلاَّ يَقْدِرُونَ (الحديد، 29)

So that the followers of the book may know that they do not control aught of the grace of Allah (Shakir, 1999:367).

The negation in "لئلا" is inconsiderable from one aspect because it is not used to satisfy the truth-value of negation; on the other hand, it is considerable and not augmented from another aspect as it
comes to affirm the negation which follows in «لا يَقْدِرُونَ» (الجرجاني، 1999:234).

الجرجاني (1989: 286) in “Proofs of Inimitability” explains the ambivalence he presented in “Secrets of Rhetoric” (that an utterance is “considerable from a point of view” “inconsiderable from another point of view”) in the following:

واعلم أنه إذا كان بيتا في الشيء أنه لا يحتمل إلا الوجه الذي هو عليه حتى لا يُشكَّل، و حتى لا يحتاج في العلم بأن ذلك حقه وان الصواب إلى فكر و روية فلا مزية. و إننا تكون المزية و يجب الفضل إذا احتمل في ظاهر الحال غير الوجه الذي جاء عليه وجهًا آخر، ثم رأيت النفس تنبو عن ذلك الوجه الآخر، ورأيت للذي جاء عليه حُسنا وقبولا تعدها إذا أنت تركته للثاني.

Be aware that if an utterance is to be assumed not to come in a way other than the one it does, so that it would not be misunderstood to have no merit in being that way; moreover, the merit and the grace of such an utterance is in the assumption that it has a meaning which would not be carried if it comes in a way other than that it is expected to be. Besides, one feels unsatisfied with the alternate utterance since the way it comes with has an essence and preference which the utterance would lack if it goes the other way.

الجرجاني (1989: 301; 1999: 232) puts in plain words that what seems to be ellipsis, but not, with the evidence that the text does not follow traditional parsing, embodies a sort of transformational allegory. He presents the following qur’anic verse as an example:

٨٢ وَأَسَّلَ أَهْلَ الْقَرْيَةِ (يُوسُفَ : ٨٢)

which literally means «and ask the village» (and translated (by Shakir, 1999:154) as «and inquire in the town”). The ayah is not specific in a state that a hearer may expect it to be specific as in «وَاسْأَلْ أُهْلَ الْقَرْيَةِ» (and ask the townspeople), a case which is called
«العلاقة المكانية» (local relation) in the transformational allegory. The al-Jarjani rejects that an allegory occurs by means of ellipsis as proclaimed before him; but rather, it is an allegory by a seeming violation indicated in meaning based syntagm; so, it is a seeming ellipsis (الجرباني, 1999: 232; مطلوب و البصير, 1990: 242; باطاهر, 2008: 275, n.d: 217). Other examples that باتاهر (الجرباني: 1989: 521) gives for ellipsis are:

وَإِمَّا تََافَنَّ مِنْ قَوْمٍ خِيَانَةٌ (الأَنْفَالَ : ٥٨)

And if you fear treachery on the part of a people (Shakir, 1999: 115),

أي قوم عاهدوك خيانة

i.e. a group that promised, then betrayed you.

فَشَِّدْ بِِمْ مَنْ خَلْفَهُمْ (الأَنْفَالَ : ٥٥)

Then scatter by them those who are in their rear (Shakir, 1999: 115).

أي فشد بم مَنْ خلفهم من الكفرة

i.e. Then scatter by them those unbelievers who are in their rear.

شَبْرٌ (١٨٤)

وَلَا يُنبِئُكَ مِثْلُ خَبِيرٍ (فَاطِرٌ : ٤١)

And none can inform you like the One Who is Aware (Shakir, 1999: 287).

أي لا ينبئك بخبرك بحقيقة الحال مثل خبير

i.e. And none can inform you about the truth of what your state devolves to like the One Who is Aware of all things. (شَبْرٌ: ١٩٩٩: ٤٣٦)
Therefore, the main purpose of transformational allegory is the concision in an utterance. Such allegory owes more to infringement in syntactic categories rather than to semantic roles of words because ellipsis, addition and preposing for example, though seeming, owe to syntactic categorization, rather than semantic issues.

As for (الجرجا، 1989: 286), an utterance should be made to accommodate a specific purpose. As a sort of meaning based syntagm, a preposing process, indicating a change in the formulation of an utterance, would increase the meaning of that utterance. However, it is not at random or redundant change since it is purposive, aiming at an effect. Such increase in the meaning of an utterance is a quantity increase rather than a multiple meaning utterance. For example, in the Qur’anic verse:

وَجَعَلُوا لَِِّ شَُكَاءَ الجِْنَّ (الأنعام: 100)

And they make the jinn associates with Allah (Shakir, 1999:87).

(and literally means ‘They made (for) Allah associates of the jinn’ with the syntactic form SVOO) the ayah carries a second meaning which the utterance would not acquire if it is to be:

وَجَعَلُوا الجِْنَّ شَُكَاءَ لَِِّ

They made the jinn associates with Allah.

The case is that they (i.e. the polytheists) made the jinn associates and worshiped them with Allah. This meaning exists in both وَجَعَلُوا لَِِّ شَُكَاءَ الجِْنَّ (الأنعام: 100) (الله شَُكَاءَ الحِجََنَ) and وَجَعَلُوا لَِِّ شَُكَاءَ لَِِّ (الأنعام: 100: شَُكَاءَ الحِجََنَ), the utterance carries an additional or implicit meaning which is that there should be no associates with Allah, neither from the jinn nor anyone other than the jinn. In this utterance, concision is observed with an effective meaning to be conveyed (الجرجا، 1989: 288).

Another example which explains how what is expected to be
specific in an utterance is expressed with a generic reference, but with an implicature, is:

وَلَتَجِدَنَّمْ أَحْرَصَ النَّاسِ عَلَيَّ حَيَاةً (البقرة: 96)

And you will most certainly find them the greediest of men for life (Shakir, 1999: 9).

Here the use of "حياة" (life) instead of "الحياة" (the life) with the definite article implicates that people’s greed is in what remains in their lifetime and not in their whole life, since one cannot be greedy (or avaricious) in what is bypass (الجرجاني, 1989: 288-9).

2.3 Perspectives on Transformational Allegory

المجاز المرسل (transformational allegory) does not explicitly mention the term "المجاز المرسل" in «Proofs of Inimitability», though it is mentioned in a section title in «Secrets of Rhetoric» (الجرجاني, 1999:227). However, 321 (مطلب و البصير) claim that السكاك (d. 626) is the first who used the term «المجاز المرسل» though عيد (n.d: 217) plainly declares that the الجرجاني is predominant to comprehend transformational allegory. So, السكاك precedes الجرجاني in presenting the term «المجاز المرسل», and in presenting details about it.

Another concern is what is claimed by 321 (مطلب و البصير) (الجرجاني) that follows للفرويديي in defining «transformational allegory» in the supposition that it is the case where the relationship between the original meaning and the transferred meaning is an association, other than simile, such as «اليد اذا استعملت في النعمة» (the hand which is borrowed for the meaning of blessing). To comment on that the following points are presented:

In what is described as the relationship between the original meaning and the transferred meaning, there is a metaphoric relationship since we borrow the word "اليد" (i.e. the likened) and claim its meaning for «النعمة» (blessing) (i.e. the likened to). Hence,
I give the utterance: «له عندي يد» (I owe him a blessing) an allegorical meaning with association other than simile because it is a sort of «لفظ منتقل» (transferred utterance), as he asserts:

إطلاق اسم الاستعارة عليه بعيد و لو كان اللفظ يستحق الوصف بالاستعارة بمجرد النقل

It is too far to call it as metaphor; however, an utterance deserves to be labeled as metaphoric if it is merely transferred.

So, what “القزويني” referred to is a «transferred utterance» which is similar to metaphor, but it does not fall under what requires interpretation.

Following الجرجاني, «transformational allegory» is a mode of «syntagm» that is a matter of a seeming violation of syntactic formulation as in that of ellipsis, addition or preposing, while ‘I owe him a blessing’ falls in none.

On the other hand, Abdul-Raof (2006:225) claims that in Arabic Rhetoric the term “المجاز المرسل” means «hypallage». Cuddon (1998: 405) defines hypallage as:

A figure of speech in which the epithet is transferred from the appropriate noun to modify another to which it does not really belong. Common examples are a sleepless night, ... a happy day.

This indicates that “Hypallage” is not related to "المجاز المرسل" (transformational allegory) since it owes to transferring an epithet (or feature) from a noun (or thing) to another. This is compatible to the second type of metaphor; nonetheless, the grammatical category of the examples, (article + adjective + noun), has nothing to do with the meaning based syntagm.
2.4 Conversational Implicature, Interpretation and the Purpose of Speech

Interpretation for the jurjani is that procedure with which one's mind associates utterances with those purposes and intentions of a conversation. In this respect, الجرجا (1999: 215) says:

حد المجاز .... إن كل جملة أخرجت الحكم المفاد بها عن موضوعه من العقل لضرب من التأول.

The delimitation of allegory is that any sentence that intellectually does not coincide its intended meaning except passing through interpretation.

Perceiving conversational implicatures depends on those steps with which the mind moves from the utterance to its meaning then to the conversational implicature that it carries. (ibid:601-) explains the meaning of التأويل » (interpretation) and how it is related to the process with which the mind reaches the meanings that a speaker intends to convey. To interpret an utterance is to acquire the meaning it devolves from diction, and then the hearer recovers the optimally relevant interpretation where «sense internal» (عبد الجليل 2001). This process is called « التأول », for الجرجا (1999:60:1-1999:60) puts it in plain words:

ليس ههنا عبارة اخص بهذا البيان من التأول .....فالمشابهات المتأولة التي يتزعها العقل من الشيء للشيء لا تكون في حد المشابهات الأصلية الظاهرة بل الشبه العقلي كأن الشيء به يكون شبيها بالشبه به.

No description has been more accurate than «interpretation» to define this notification. The interpreted associations which are mentally extracted from a thing to another are not based on the apparent resemblance, but the intellectual resemblance as if the feature (or component) borrowed to a thing makes that thing similar
to the likened.

Talk exchanges that participants perform are based on the assumption that a speaker communicates so that a hearer is aware of his intended meaning and his purpose. A conversational implicature is an intellectual means to purpose in view of the fact that a speaker exposes the purpose of his speech through the transformational allegory, such as exaltation and derogatory judgment (الجرجاني, 1989: 530, 1-410).

Interpretation is a speaker-hearer correlation with the supposition that a hearer extracts semantic features from a speaker’s utterance so as to compose an associate representing his purpose, his intention and any implicit meaning included in that intention. It is the selection of the appropriate among a paradigm of associations. Therefore, interpretation is the cornerstone with which an utterance can be discriminated to have a conversational implicature.

3. DATA ANALYSIS

3.1 The Model of Analysis

To analyze utterances with generalized conversational implicatures in this study, it has been established that such implicature (GCI) is generated by a purposive infringement of the grammatical categorization of a word in an utterance. Both Grice (1989:26) and الجرجاني (1989:87) consider the utterance in a talk exchange as a means to express meaning reflecting speaker’s intention. In addition, they consider speech (or text of linguistic communication) as cooperative efforts that each participant recognizes in them a purpose or a set of purposes. So, this section deals with both, the analysis of texts with generalized conversational implicatures as well as those purposes recognized in them.

To analyze religious texts in English and Arabic, examples of
GCIs of both Grice and الجرجااني are to be taken into consideration. Generalized conversational implicatures can be extended to the following possible examples:

Pro-form: A violation of the first maxim of Quantity can be observed in the use of pro-forms.

Rhetorical Question: An RQ is a forceful statement that has the form of a question, but does not expect an answer (Richards and Schmidt, 2002:459).

In the present study, it is possible to recognize favourable or unfavourable purposes derived from the religious texts. A purpose is volition or something in mind that language is supposed to achieve. A possible dichotomy of such purposes is: admiration and contempt, consent and regret (or indignation), exaltation and derogatory judgment, supplication and repudiation, preachment and enticement, commendation and reproach, etc (See, مطلوب والبصیر 9-116:1990).

As far as GCI is concerned, the present study is going to analyze data from certain religious verses selected from different Gospels of The New Testament and certain ayahs selected from different Surahs of the Glorious Qur’an. GCI is given a classification embodying both Grice’s and that model of الجرجااني since both models are concerned, not with an infringement of the semantic content of an expression, but a syntactic one. Examples of the GCI include non-specific expressions, addition, ellipsis, preposing or postposing, pro-form, rhetorical question and repetition. However, the following figure embodies a development of the Grecian account of conversational implicature:
Generalized Conversational Implicature in English and Arabic

Figure (2): The Model of the Study
3.2 Analysis of English Texts

3.2.1 Text 1

Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad; you can tell a tree by its fruit. You vipers’ brood! How can your words be good when you yourselves are evil?

(Matt, 12: 33-34)

Jesus’ controversy with the Pharisees is that people have a free will to choose good or evil. One’s theism is embedded in the sequel of his deeds. Jesus’ derogatory judgment of the Pharisees is that they are hypocrite with their wrongdoings (فكري: htt://st-takla.org/pub_Bible-Interpretations). The following analysis is to be applied:

a- Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad;

Though only the first imperative is intended, the second is made to show that people have free will to choose good or evil. This composes an apparent violation of the second maxim of Quantity. Hence, “Either…. or” is not used to satisfy its truth-value of a disjunctive meaning since Jesus (u) intends that people should choose only “good”, rather than evil.

b- How can your words be good when you yourselves are evil?

An infringement of the first maxim of Quantity is made with a rhetorical question which is used to indicate that the Pharisees’ words cannot be good whence they themselves are evil. Another violation is that of the second maxim of Quantity, i.e. the use of the emphatic reflexive pronoun “yourselves” “in an appositional relation to its antecedent” (Quirk et al, 1985: 356). It gives an emphasis on directing contempt towards the Pharisees, and not someone else.

a- GCI: non- specific: People have a free will to choose good or
evil.

b:–

i- GCI. RQ: The Pharisees’ words cannot be good while they themselves are evil.

ii- GCI. Repetition: The criticism made concentrates on the addressed Pharisees.

A general purpose derived from the text as a whole is:

• PS. It is contempt.

3.2.2. Text 2

*You are Peter, the Rock; and on this rock I will build my church, and the powers of death shall never conquer it.* (Matt, 16:1720-)

In this text, Jesus (u) assigns a religious responsibility upon Peter, one of the disciples. The coordinator “and” denotes a relationship between the contents of clauses (Quirk and Greenbaum, 1973:257). In this utterance, it is not used to satisfy its truth-value in this text since what follows “and” is neither a correlative nor a consequence to what precedes it. A paraphrase of the clauses may clarify the relationship among them:

i. Peter is the Rock.

ii. Jesus (υ) will build his church on this rock.

iii. The power of death shall never conquer the church.

First, these clauses contain different subjects. Second, neither (ii) is a consequence or a result of (i) nor (iii) is a consequence or a result of (ii). So, the semantic contents of these clauses are not related. This coordination can be explained in Jesus’ portrait of a whole image perceived from the context. The coordinated clauses
are parts of this whole image expressed in the text and it is only by this sort of coordination an image is created. The implicature carried by “and” is a GCI.

i- GCI. Repetition: The whole of what is said constitutes one image.

The whole text can have the following purpose:

• PS: It is commendation.

Text 3

As they sat at supper Jesus said ‘I tell you this: one of you will betray me __ one who is eating with me.’ At this they were dismayed; and one by one they said to him, ‘not I, surly?’ ‘It is one of the twelve’, he said ‘who is dipping into same bowl with me. The Son of Man is going the way appointed for him in the scriptures; but alas for that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed! It would be better for that man if he had never been born’. (Mark, 14:18- 21)

Sitting with his disciples in his last supper, Jesus (u) exposes that one of the disciples, referring to Judas, betrays him (فكري: http://st-takla.org/pub_Bible-Interpretations). A prophecy in the scriptures is to be materialized that one of Jesus› disciples, i.e. Judas, betrays him. The following analysis is to be applied:

a- ‘I tell you this: one of you will betray me __ one who is eating with me.’ At this they were dismayed; and one by one they said to him, ‘not I, surly?’ ‘It is one of the twelve’, he said ‘who is dipping into same bowl with me.’

Jesus (السّي) is well aware of the one who betrays him, but he does not call him by name. So, he is not specific in a position where he is expected to be so; a GCI is generated with this violation of the first maxim of Quantity, implicating that though Jesus (السّي) knows
who the betrayer is, the disciples do not suspect Judas. Another violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made with the non-specific expression “one” in the clause “one who is eating with me”; Jesus () does not scandalize Judas though he knows his inner self which is not apparent for the others. This is because Judas shows himself to be loyal to Jesus (). Jesus affirms that the betrayer is one of his disciples, one of those who share dinner with him. This gives a GCI implicating that it is possible that a prophet is betrayed by those who are so close to him.

b- but alas for that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed! It would be better for that man if he had never been born.’

Jesus () refers to Judas who sits beside him with “that man”, not being specific in reference; “that” refers to a distant person because Judas is further from suspicion. This violation of the first maxim of Quantity results in a GCI, implicating that it is much unexpected for the disciples that Judas is the betrayal. Jesus () imparts his regret for what Judas’ destiny would devolve to because of his betrayal.

Hence, it possible to derive the following implicatures:

a- :

I. GCI: Non-specific: Though Jesus knows who the betrayer is, the disciples do not suspect Judas for a betrayal.

II. GCI. Non-specific: It is possible that a prophet is betrayed by those who are so close to him.

b- GCI: Non-specific: It is much unexpected for the disciples that Judas is the betrayer.

A general purpose derived from the text as a whole is:

- PS: It is indignation.
3.2.4. Text 4

O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that murders the prophets and stones the messengers sent to her! How often have I longed to gather your children, as a hen gathers her brood under her wings; but you would not let me. Look, look! There is your temple, forsaken by God. (Luke, 13: 34-35)

Jesus (Jesus in this text converses the Pharisees, but his words addresses Jerusalem in a reproof. He imparts that Jerusalem is a doomed city that murders the prophets, stones the messengers and prevents Jesus to gather its people under his authority. The following analysis is to be considered.

a- O Jerusalem, Jerusalem,

The repetition of “Jerusalem” in this text indicates a violation of the second maxim of Quantity. The Groaning expressed by “O”, with the repetition of the word “Jerusalem” implicates that Jesus is very discontented with the persecution of the people of Jerusalem to the prophets and messengers of God.

b- Look, look! There is your temple, forsaken by God.

The repetition of the words “Look” indicates a violation of the second maxim of Quantity, indicating an indirect warning for what the wrongdoings of the citizens of Jerusalem can devolve to.

The following implicatures can be inferred:

a. GCI. Repetition: Jesus is very discontented with the persecution of the people of Jerusalem to the prophets and messengers of God.

b. GCI. Repetition: What devolves from the wrong doings of the people of Jerusalem is a terrible thing.

The purpose of the text is:
PS: It is a reproach.

3.2.5. Text 5

You Pharisees! You clean the outside of cup and plate; but inside you there is nothing but greed and wickedness. You fools! Did not he who made the outside make the inside too? (Luke, 11:3941-)

The situational context of this text is that a Pharisee invited Jesus for a meal. When Jesus came and sat down, the Pharisee noticed with surprise that Jesus had not begun by washing before the meal (Luke, 11:378-). The following analysis can be applied:

a- You Pharisees!

Jesus addresses a Pharisee, the one who invited him for the meal, but he uses a plural noun. Therefore, the use of the “s” plural makes the utterance generic in a position where it is expected to be specific (to one Pharisee only). This embodies a violation of the first maxim of Quantity implicating that other Pharisees are just like the one addressed.

b- Did not he who made the outside make the inside too?

A rhetorical question is made to indicate that the one who made the outside did make the inside too. This gives an implication that the Pharisees, as they take care of their exteriors, they can take care of their interiors and make them inclined for charity. Hence, a violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made, generating a GCI.

It is possible to derive the following implicatures:

a. GCI. Non-specific: Jesus’ denunciation is not limited to the addressed Pharisee, but includes Pharisees in general.

b. GCI: RQ: As the Pharisees are able to take care and reform their appearances, they are also able to do that for their
beliefs.

The text as a whole can have the following purpose:

- PS: It is a derogatory judgment.

3.3 Analysis of Arabic Texts

3.3.1. Text 1

3.3 Analysis of Arabic Texts

3.3.1. Text 1

Their parable is like the parable of one who kindled a fire but when it had illuminated all around him, Allah took away their light, and left them in utter darkness——they do not see. (18) Deaf, dumb (and) blind, so they will not turn back. (19) Or like abundant rain from the cloud in which the utter darkness and thunder and lightning; they put their fingers into their ears because of thunder peal, for fear of death, and Allah encompasses the unbelievers.

(Shakir, 1999:2)

This qur’anic verse is about the hypocrites who prefer error for the right direction and go astray. The following analysis is to be derived:

a-

The phrase "(took away their light) is used
rather than "أذهب الله نورهم" (remove their light) so as not to give the meaning that he abolished the light, but to implicate that he took this light as a companion with him so that they would lose it forever (الدرويش, 1999: Vol.1:57). This indicates a violation of the first maxim of Quantity, resulting in a GCI.

b-

A violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made with the ellipsis of the subject «هم» (they). This indicates a reproach and implicates that they were of no worth of being mentioned by reference (باطاهر, 2008: 124).

c-

The expression «أصابعهم في آذانهم من الصواعق حذر الموت» embodies a violation of the first maxim of Quantity as one puts part of his finger, (i.e.»أنامل أصابعهم») (fingertips), in his ear, rather than the whole figure. This implicates that their fear was so enormous that they would have put their whole fingers in their ears if they had been able to (باطاهر, 2008: 273).

The following implicatures are to be carried:

a. GCI: Non-specific: Allah (⁠الله⁠) took this "نور" (light) as a companion with him; so, the hypocrites lost it forever.

b. GCI. Ellipsis: The hypocrites did not deserve to be mentioned by reference.

c. GCI: Non-specific: Hypocrites’ fear was so enormous that they would have put their whole fingers in their ears if they had been able to.

A general purpose of the text is:
• PS: It is a reproach.

3.3.2. Text 2

And the day when the unjust one shall bite his hands, saying: O: would that I had taken a way with the Apostle (28). O woe is me! Would that I had not taken such a one for a friend (29)! Certainly he led me astray from the reminder after it had come to me? And the Shaitan fails to aid man.  (Shakir, 1999:236)

This qur’anic verse is about “عقبة بن أبي معيط”, a tyrannous person from Quraish, who abandoned the Prophet (ﷺ) and followed his comrade “ابن خلف” (الشيرازي, 2005: Vol. 11173/). The following analysis is to be presented:

a-

وَيَوْمَ يَعَضُّ الظَّالُِ عَلىَ يَدَيْهِ

A violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made since the ayah refers to «عقبة بن أبي معيط» with the expression «الظَّالِ», rather than the proper name. This non-specification in reference results in a GCI, implicating that any tyrannous person will face the same destiny (الشيرازي, 2005: Vol. 11173/).

b-

يَا وَيْلَتَى لَيْتَنِي لَْ أَتَِّذْ فُلاَنًا خَلِيلاً

A violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made with the expression «يا ويلتي ويلتي» as it stands for the expression: ٍيا وَيْلَتَى فَانِه وَتِنَك (O my calamity come, for it is your time) (الطبري, 1995: 173).
Vol. 7289/). This reduction in the utterance implicates that a speaker’s lamentation is of great remorse and regret. The word "فُلاَنًا" (such a one) is a generic reference though it refers to "أبِي بَنّ خَلْف". The utterance carries the implicature that the notification is not limited to that person, but comprises all those who satisfy their comrades and abandon the course of the Prophet (ﷺ).

\[ \text{c-} \\
\text{وَكَانَ الشَّيْطَانُ لِلِْنْسَانِ خَذُولاً} \\
\]

A preposing process can be assumed in the utterance since it is possible to say "وَكَانَ الشَّيْطَانُ خَذُولاً لِلِْنْسَانِ". This result in an implicature that while a person might be so reliant to devil (whether this devil is a human or Shaitan), the latter seduces man easily and abandons him quickly (الدرويش, 1999: Vol.5384/).

The following implicatures are to be carried:

\[ \text{a- GCI: Non-specific: Any tyrannous person will face the same destiny as that of "عقبة".} \\
\]

\[ \text{b- :} \\
\]

i. GCI: Ellipsis: Speaker’s lamentation is of great remorse and regret.

ii. GCI: Non-specific: The notification in the ayah is not limited to that person, but comprises all those who satisfy their comrades and abandon the course of the Prophet (ﷺ).

\[ \text{c- GCI: Preposing: Some people are so reliant to devil who seduces them easily and abandons them quickly.} \\
\]

The text as a whole can have the following purpose:

- PS: It is a reproach.
3.3.3 Text 3

Allah is the light of the heavens and the earth; a likeness of His light is a niche in which is a lamp, the lamp is in a glass, (and) the glass is as it were a brightly shining star, lit from a blessed olive-tree, neither eastern nor western, the oil whereof almost gives light though fire touch not. Light upon light. Allah guides to His light whom He pleases, and Allah sets forth parable for men, and Allah is Cognizant of all things (36) In houses which Allah has permitted to be exalted and that His name may be remembered in them; their glorify Him there in the morning and the evenings.

(Shakir: 1999, 231)

This qur’anic verse signifies an exemplum of the guidance of Allah to deism. The niche refers to the heart of the Prophet Mohammed (ﷺ), the lamp refers to the light of his knowledge, and the glass is Imam Ali ()&&(ывает من شَجَرَةٍ مَبَارَكَةٍ زَيْتُونَةٍ

A violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made with the utterance since what lightens a lamp is the oil of the olive-tree rather than the tree itself. This implicates that the tree referred to is not a planted tree, but the posterity of Abraham who conducted the way
of deism.

b-

في بُيوتِ آدَمَ اللهٌ أنْ تُرْفَعَ وَيُذْكُرُ فِيهَا اسْمُهُ يُسَبِّحُ لَهُ فِيهَا بِالْغُدُوِّ وَالآصَالِ

These houses are the houses of the prophets, including the house of Imam Ali and Fatima ( ambos), which is the best among them (البطابائي: Vol.15142/). A violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made since it is not the houses which are to be exalted, but those who domicile in them. The utterance is not specific in a position it is expected to be specific. So, Allah ( ) orders to elevate those houses as a reverence to those who keep on praising Allah ( ) and glorifying His name.

The following inferences are to be considered:

a. GCI. Ellipsis: The tree referred to is not a planted tree, but the posterity of Abraham ( ) (and of the Prophet ( )) who conducted the way of deism.

b. GCI: Non-specific: Allah ( ) orders to exalt those who keep on praising Him ( ) and glorifying His name.

A general purpose derived from the text is:

• PS: It is commendation.

3.3.4. Text 4

كَذَلِكَ كِدْنَا لِيُوسُفَ مَا كَانَ لِيَأْخُذَ أَخَاهُ فيِ دِينِ المَْلِكِ إِلاَّ أنْ يَشَاءَ الَُّ نَرْفَعُ درَجَاتٍ

(75) قَالُوا إِنْ يَسِْقْ فَقَدْ سَرََقَ أَخٌ لَهُ مِنْ قَبْلُ

(77) فَأَسَرَّهَا يُوسُفُ فِي نَفْسِهِ وَلَْ يُبْدِهَا لَُمْ قَالَ أَنْتُمْ شَيْ إِنَّهُمْ قَالُوا إِنَّهُمْ أَنْتُمْ شَرٌّ مَكَانًا وَاللهُ أَعْلَمُ بِماَ تَصِفُونَ (77)

( يوسف: 5-76)

thus we do punish the wrongdoers (76). So, he began with their
sacks before the sack of his bothers, then he brought it out from his brother’s sack. Thus we did plan for the sake of Yusuf; it was not (lawful) that he should take his brother under the king’s law unless Allah pleased; we raise the degrees of whomsoever we please, and above every one possessed of knowledge is the All-knowing one (77). (Shakir, 1999: 153)

In this qur’anic verse, Yusuf (Joseph) tried to keep his full brother with him; so, he made a plan showing that the breaker of the king was missed, then he showed it to be in his full brother’s sack. Following Jacob’s law, Yusuf (Joseph) could keep his brother with him as a step to get contacted with his family. The following analysis is to be made:

a-

كَذَلِكَ كِدْنَا لِيُوسُفَ مَا كَانَ لِيَأْخُذَ أَخَاهُ فِيَ دِينِ المَلِكِ إِلَّاَ أَنْ يَشَاءَ اللَّهُ

A violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made since just the reason for the plan is mentioned in the utterance, rather than the plan itself; the proposition that Yusuf (Joseph) could take his full brother under Jacob’s law is omitted to implicate that Allah (God) handled all that by inspiring Yusuf (1995, الطبرسي: Vol.5/ 436).

b-

فَأَسَرََّهَا يُوسُفُ فِي نَفْسِهِ وَلَْ يُبْدِهَا لَُمْ قَالَ أَنْتُمْ شٌَّ مَكَانًا وَالَُّ أَعْلَمُ بِماَ تَصِفُونَ

A violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made. The personal pronoun "أَنْتُمْ" (you), is used (instead of "هم" (they)) though Yusuf addressed his brothers in a monologue. This implicates that Yusuf (Joseph) intended to reprimand his brothers for what they had done with him and his full brother, but it was not the appropriate time for that.

The following implicatures are to be considered:

a. GCI. Ellipsis: The plan was not that of Yusuf because Allah
(النبياء: 62–63) قَالُوا أَأَنْتَ فَعَلْتَ هَذَا بِآلَِتِنَا يَا إِبْرَاهِيمُ (62) قَالَ بَلْ فَعَلَهُ كَبِيرُهُمْ هَذَا فَأَسْأَلُوهُمْ إِنْ كَأَنَا يَنْطِقُونَ (63) They said: Have you done this to our Gods, O Abraham? (Shakir, 1999:212)

This Qur’anic verse is about the summons of the Prophet Abraham (صلى الله عليه وسلم) to his people, specially his uncle “آزر“. Abraham raised an argumentation with his people as he shattered the idols, hoping that his people would abandon the worship of those idols and follow him in worshipping Allah. The following analysis is drawn:

a-
قالَوْا أَلَّذَا فَعَلْتَ هَذَا بِآلِيَنَا يَا إِبْرَاهِيمُ

The first maxim of Quantity is violated since the pro-form verb «فَعَلْتَ» (done) replaces the verb phrase “حَطَمَتِهَا” (broke them into pieces). This implicates that the jury dare not utter the words that demeaned their gods (الشيرازي, 2005: Vol. 10/ 132).

b-
A violation of the first maxim of Quantity is made with the assumption that the word « "إنّا" (if) is not used to satisfy its truth-value of a conditional clause since Abraham (אברם), as well as his people already knew that the idols could never speak. This carries a GCI, implicating that the smashed idols were helpless and did not deserve worshipping.

The following implicatures are to be taken:

a. GCI. Pro-form. The jury did not dare to utter the words that demeaned their gods.

b. GCI. Non-specific: The smashed idols were helpless and did not deserve worshipping.

A general purpose that can be derived from the text is:

• PS: It is enticement.

4. CONCLUSIONS

4.1. Conclusions

Tracing the hypotheses presented in the outset of the study, the following conclusions are derived:

1. In both English and Arabic, a GCI is exposed to be the final step of the process of interpreting an utterance that leads to a purpose. It is an inference due to mental discern of what is intended to be conveyed and it relies on speaker’s self-commitment to facilitate the transferring of his message, hearer’s deduction of the message conveyed and the conventionality of the message.

2. Both approaches, Grice’s and that of الجرجاني، manifest a
ground of applicability to both English and Arabic religious texts. Seeing that both theorists work on the additional meanings which utterances may carry to represent speakers’ intentions, both approaches are concerned with the same subject. It is possible to make a blend of the two approaches so as to compose reciprocal integrity of a pragmatic description.

The above mentioned conclusions validate the first hypothesis

3. An utterance is made to reconcile a speaker’s intention and satisfy those purposes of talk exchange in which a speaker and a hearer are engaged. Utterances carrying conversational implicatures are exposed to be more effective since language draws attention to itself, and more economic, showing a set of words with plenitude of signification. This validates the second hypothesis of the study.

4. The purpose of speech is the end result in the interpretation of an utterance as it reflects the aim why participants exchange information. A possible dichotomy of purposes that an implicature can hand round is: admiration and contempt, consent and regret (or indignation), exaltation and derogatory judgment, supplication and repudiation, etc. This validates the third hypothesis of the study.

4.2 Other Possible Conclusions

1. Levinson’s revision of the ‘generalized conversational implicature’ does not coincide that of Grice; he delineates Grice’s notion of conventional implicature as generalized conversational implicature.

2. Since “المجاز المرسل” (transformational allegory) according to the Algerian is a mode of speech in which an utterance is
considerable from a point of view, inconsiderable from another point of view, neither الدقاقي’s definition nor Abdul-Raof›s translation of المجاز المرسل is precise to الجرجاني’s description of المجاز المرسل (transformational allegory).

3. The interpretation of an utterance is that process with which a hearer infers a conversational implicature and the purpose of that implicature. It is a speaker-hearer correlation with the supposition that a hearer extracts semantic features from a speaker›s utterance so as to compose an associate representing his purpose, his intention and any implicit meaning included in that intention. It is the selection of the appropriate among a paradigm of associations (or obtainable significations). So, interpretation is the cornerstone with which an utterance can be discriminated to have a conversational implicature.

4. In English, a GCI owes to syntactic infringement indicated mainly in a violation of the first maxim of Quantity. With a violation of the syntactic formulation of an utterance, specific expressions, especially those of a closed class system, are used so as not to satisfy their truth-values, but an explanation is needed to infer additional meanings. On the other hand, a GCI in Arabic owes mainly to those transformational processes which indicate a violation of the syntactic formulation, though it can be generated by expressions with a non-truth functional ground.

5. In both languages, perception of a conversational implicature is directed by the use of words rather than their denotations.
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